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미국 터프스 대학 교수, 김대중 死後 평가
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포린 폴리시誌에 게재. "햇볕은 없다" "실패한 對北정책이 민주화의 功을 무색하게 만들 것"
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미국의 권위 있는 외교 및 전략 문제 전문잡지인 '포린 폴리시'(Foreign Policy) 인터넷판은 작년 김대중씨 死去(사거) 직후 미국의 名門 터프스 대학교의 플레처 스쿨(외교 및 법과 대학) 소속 한국계 이성윤 조교수가 쓴 '햇볕은 없다'(Ain't No Sunshine)라는 제목의 글을 실었다.
'Ain't No Sunshine'은 1971년 미국 가수 빌 위더스가 발표하여 대유행하였던 노래의 제목이다.
이 글에서 李 교수는 김대중에 대한 역사적 평가는 2000년 6월 김정일과의 회담과 그 부작용에 의하여 결정될 것이라고 주장하였다. 그는 북한의 核개발을 돕고 북한동포들에 대한 인권탄압을 외면한 過(과)가 그의 민주투쟁이란 功(공)을 덮을 것이라고 내다 보았다.
<김씨는 한국 역사에서 경제문제에 대한 공헌이나 反정부 투사로서 한국의 정치적 권리를 향상시킨 점이 아니라 대통령으로서 실패한 對北정책과 연관되어 기록될 것이다.
그는 북한과의 화해를 추진하였음에도 불구하고 북한 동족의 기본권 문제에 관련하여선 아무런 희망과 비전을 보여주지 못하였다. 그의 대통령 在任(재임) 기간 내내 김씨는 북한에서 지속되는 광범한 인권탄압 문제를 철저하게 묵살하였다. 2001년 3월 워싱턴의 한 유력 연구소에서 한 연설에서 그는 한반도에서 가장 큰 인권문제는 이산가족의 문제이며 그의 정부는 이 분야에서 진전을 보이고 있다고 연설하였다.
그러나 그보다 더 심각한, 북한정권에 의한 조직적이고 광범위한 민간인 핍박-예컨대 거대한 강제수용소가 운영되고 있으며 그 안에서 공개처형, 중노동, 구타, 고문, 굶기기 등이 일상적으로 잔인하게 일어나고 있는 점에 대하여 그는 침묵을 선택하였다.>
李 교수는 김 당시 대통령이 김정일과의 회담을 위하여 북한에 건네준 5억 달러는 당시 북한 수출액과 비슷한 액수였다고 지적하고, <최우선적인 국가 목표를 체제유지, 핵무기와 대량살상무기의 개발, 그리고 서울 정부와의 생존경쟁에 두고 있는 세습專制(전제)체제에 대한 김씨의 현금 선물은 심각한, 전략적-도덕적 의미를 지닌다>고 표현하였다.
李 교수는 소위 남북정상 회담이 5억 달러를 주고 "매수하였다"는 표현도 하였다. 김대중 측근들이 5억 달러를 준 사실이 밝혀지자 이를 평화를 위한 투자라고 강변하고, 한국과 같은 경제대국으로선 오히려 너무 적은 돈이라고 말한 사실도 소개하였다.
그는 또 <김대중씨가 지난 7월 입원하기 사흘 전에 가진 BBC와의 인터뷰에서 자신은 북한에 돈을 준 사실이 없고, 문제의 5억 달러는 현대그룹이 사업권을 얻기 위하여 준 것이라고 주장하였다>면서 이는 수사 결과와 다르다고 설명하였다.
<선거로 뽑힌 지도자가 이렇게 수상쩍고 위험한 금전 거래를 한 사실이 한국 국민들에게 끼칠 영향에 대하여는 앞으로 더 지켜볼 일이다. 2000년 이후 남한 정부는 수십억 달러와 다른 상납물들을 북한에 퍼붓다시피 하였다. 그 사이 북한 당국은 두 차례의 핵실험과 두 차례의 장거리 미사일 발사 시험을 했으며, 여러 차례의 단거리 미사일 발사 실험을 했고, 고농축 우라늄 방식에 의한 핵무기 개발도 병행하였다. 북한은 또 이 기간에 미사일, 핵기술, 가짜 미국 화폐, 그리고 마약류를 널리 확산시켰다.
지금 확실해진 것은 김대중과 노무현이 북한정권을 상대로 헤프고 원칙없는 접촉을 해온 결과는, 북한정권의 핵무기 개발 의지 및 북한주민들에 대한 야만적인 압박을 약화시키는 데 실패하였다는 사실이다.>
李 교수는 김대중 장례기간중 <한국의 主流 언론이 감정적으로, 정치적으로 민감한 시기에 과거처럼 또 다시 (김대중에 대한 일방적인 美化 분위기에) 반대하는 목소리를 틀어막아버렸다>고 비판하였다.
<김대중의 업적은 당연한 듯이 추모되었지만 그의 실패는 이런 분위기에서 언급되지 않았다. (중략). 그러나 역사는 지도자의 행동을 기준으로 평가하지, 말년의 생애에 대한 피상적이면서도 신랄한 관찰이나 그들이 죽었을 때 보인 추모의 한 순간을 가지고 평가하지는 않는다. 김대중이 대통령으로서 남긴 유산, 즉 남한에 대한 북한의 核위협이 증대하도록 도와주고, 수백만의 북한사람들에 대하여 조직적이고 지속적으로 일어나는 人權탄압을 외면하였다는 사실은 그가 남한의 민주주의를 발전시키는 데 수십년간 헌신하였음에도 불구하고 그 어떤 눈물과 세월로도 지울 수 없는 汚点(오점)이다.>
李 교수의 글은, 한국 언론의 일방적인 故人(고인) 美化 풍조와는 너무나 다른 균형 잡히고 엄정한 死後(사후) 평가였다. 公人의 죽음에 대한 글은 이렇게 써야 한다는 모범이 될 만하다. 무엇보다도 英文이 아름답다.
*기고문 全文
Ain't No Sunshine
Kim Dae-jung may have been a democrat, but the late South Korean president was no saint. His true legacy will be one of utter failure in dealing with his northern neighbor.
Since his death on Aug. 18, Kim Dae-jung has been celebrated as a "great leader." Delivering his eulogy at Kim's state funeral on Aug. 23, South Korean Prime Minister Han Seung-soo called the former president "a great leader of modern history," one whose "sacrifices, dedication, and devotion allowed freedom, human rights, and democracy to fully blossom in Korea." North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's appraisal was understandably more muted, but nonetheless laudatory. In his condolence message, the northern Kim said of the southern Kim that the "feats" the latter performed "will remain long with the nation." North Korea even sent a high-level mourning delegation to Seoul, the first of its kind in recognition of a South Korean leader.
Kim Dae-jung's death comes less than three months after the suicide of his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, and amid speculation about the condition of the ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. These three men are joined to each other in history by the so-called Sunshine Policy, a failed, decade-long experiment geared toward improving relations with Kim Jong Il's North Korea that was initiated by Kim Dae-jung and carried on by Roh Moo-hyun. The three men represent an era, one that is more likely to be remembered for Seoul's misplaced aid to a totalitarian regime than for any meaningful advances in political, economic, or humanitarian issues in inter-Korean relations.
For four decades, Kim Dae-jung was a prominent figure on the South Korean political scene. In his younger days as the country's leading dissident, Kim was able to present to his compatriots a vision of what his country should strive to become. He was a powerful symbol of the country's struggle for democracy and human rights at a time when South Korea's rapidly rising material culture engendered greater calls for political freedom and civil rights. Then, as president from 1998 to 2003, Kim was able to restructure the country's powerful-but-overextended conglomerates and banks and pay back the $60 billion that the International Monetary Fund had loaned his country in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.
Kim will most likely be recorded in the annals of Korean history, however, not for his contributions to the economy or his efforts at advancing South Korea's political rights as a dissident, but for his failed North Korea policy as president.
Despite his pursuit of reconciliation with North Korea, when it came to the question of the fundamental rights of his fellow Koreans north of the border, Kim was unable to present any vision of hope. In fact, throughout his term in office, he assiduously downplayed the widespread human rights abuses in North Korea. Incredibly, Kim told an audience at a leading Washington think tank in March 2001 that the greatest human rights problem in the Korean peninsula was that of the separated families between the two Koreas and that his administration was making progress on that admittedly important issue. But on the far graver issue of the North Korean regime's systemic and widespread attack on its civilian population including the operation of vast political prisoner concentration camps where random beating, torture, public execution, hard labor, and starvation are brutal everyday realities Kim chose to remain silent.
Kim's presidency was capped by the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000. His meeting with the North Korean leader in Pyongyang was hailed worldwide at the time as the dawn of an era of peace on the Korean peninsula. The man who had staked his presidency on mending relations with Pyongyang was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that year.
But the summit was later revealed to have been bought and paid for by the southern Kim with a secret transfer of $500 million to the northern Kim in the days leading up to the dramatic occasion. Facing public criticism and an investigation by a special prosecutor, Kim Dae-jung and his supporters argued that the payment was a "peace dividend," an investment in peace and reconciliation. Some insisted that it was a small price to pay for lasting inter-Korean reconciliation, a small burden that the South Korean economy the 12th largest in the world could easily bear.
What went unmentioned, however, was that the half a billion dollars in question was roughly equal to North Korea's export earnings at the time. It was an enormous cash infusion for North Korea, one of the smallest and most isolated economies in the world. Kim's cash gift to a hereditary totalitarian leadership that identifies as its highest state priorities regime preservation, advancement of its nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction programs, and existential competition against Seoul was an economic bonanza that carried serious strategic and moral implications.
The full effects on the South Korean people of such a dubious and dangerous financial transaction undertaken by their elected leader remain to be seen. But the prognosis does not augur well. Since 2000, Seoul has poured billions in cash and other blandishments into North Korea. In the meantime, Pyongyang has conducted two nuclear tests, two long-range ballistic missile tests, and multiple short-range missile tests, all while pursuing an alternate clandestine nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium. Pyongyang has proliferated missiles, nuclear technology, counterfeit U.S. currency, and narcotics.
The regime has continued to brutalize its civilian population, trampling on their most basic human rights, while issuing periodic threats of nuclear annihilation at Seoul. Even in the heyday of sunshine, in June 2002, North Korea instigated a naval skirmish that resulted in the loss of six South Korean lives. The much anticipated "peace and reconciliation" conjured up in June 2000 seems today as elusive as ever. No wonder South Koreans, increasingly disillusioned with a policy of giving unconditional aid to the North, in 2007 opted to vote for the conservative candidate, Lee Myung-bak, who ran on a platform of growing the economy and demanding accountability and reciprocity from Pyongyang.
Kim Dae-jung until his last days struggled to snuff out such shimmers of doubt. Three days before he was admitted to the hospital in July, the former president told the BBC that his administration had never sent cash to Pyongyang but only 200,000 to 300,000 tons of food and fertilizer aid each year. Kim claimed that the cash transfer of $500 million was a risk undertaken by the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai alone to secure commercial rights in North Korea.
Such claims are inconsistent with the findings of the special prosecution that led to the imprisonment of one of Kim's key aides and the conviction of several others. Only time will show to what extent Seoul's gifts to Pyongyang supported the latter's stated "military-first politics." But what has been certain for some time now is that the generous and often unprincipled engagement of the North Korean regime by Kim and his successor, Roh, managed to deter neither that regime's dogged quest for nuclear weapons nor the barbaric oppression of its own people.
The news of Kim Dae-jung's death has engulfed South Korea over the past week. After a six-day mourning period, the Lee administration honored Kim with a state funeral in the National Assembly compound despite intense criticism from conservative groups. Hundreds of government officials, prominent politicians, and foreign dignitaries, as well as thousands of ordinary mourners, bade farewell to the iconic former president before he was finally laid to rest in the national cemetery later in the day.
The North Korean delegation, led by Kim Yang Gon, Pyongyang's spy master, and a senior secretary of the communist party, marks the first high-level meeting between Seoul and Pyongyang since Lee Myung-bak took office. The North Korean envoys visited Lee on the morning of the funeral and conveyed a message from Kim Jong Il calling for improved relations. Thus, as the world pontificated for the past year on what possible change and opportunity might come in the wake of the demise of the ailing North Korean leader, it was Kim Jong Il who deftly made the most of the change and opportunity created in the wake of the death of his favorite South Korean leader.
The northern Kim is making the most of South Korea's volatile situation to alter the atmospherics in the Korean peninsula to one that favors unilateral concessions from Seoul to Pyongyang, as Kim Dae-jung espoused. Awash as it is in the politics of death, the Seoul government will need to summon extraordinary resolve not to fall for Pyongyang's trap. As witnessed in May in the wake of Roh's death, or even 15 years earlier in the wake of the death of Kim Il Sung, the founding dictator of North Korea, the outpouring of grief upon Kim Dae-jung's death has once again been powerful and pervasive. As in the past, the emotions expressed upon the death of a Korean leader have been raw, reactive, and real. And, as in the past, dissenting voices at an emotional and politically sensitive time like this have been shunned by South Korea's mainstream media. In effect, the death of the former South Korean leader has turned the inter-Korean tide in Pyongyang's favor.
All men are mortal, and each culture has its own mourning ritual. Koreans choose to wail over and decry the death of loved ones, as if mortality itself is unjust and the life of each dead person is one unfulfilled. The conventions of centuries-old Korean funerary rites leave little room for a sober assessment of the legacy that the dead leaves behind. Kim Dae-jung's achievements are rightfully being remembered. His failings, in the current climate, are not.
Yet, history judges leaders for their acts, not for the poignant glimpses of their twilight years or the mournful moment of their demise. Time and temperament may erase the taint that ordinary men leave behind. But Kim Dae-jung's presidential legacy, abetting a growing nuclear threat toward South Koreans and ignoring the continued systematic abuse of millions of North Koreans, is a mark that despite his decades-long devotion to advancing democracy in South Korea no amount of time or tears is likely to wash away.
Sung-Yoon Lee is adjunct assistant professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
[ 2009-08-28, 23:00 ]
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