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李대통령이 가장 확실하게 망하는 방법
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북한에 가서 김정일을 만나고, 6.15 반역선언을 존중한다고 선언하는 것.
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金九(피살), 金奎植(납북), 李厚洛(숙청), 張世東(투옥), 朴哲彦(투옥), 金宇中(파산. 투옥), 鄭夢憲(자살), 林東源(투옥), 朴智元(투옥), 盧武鉉(자살), 鄭東泳(낙선), 金大中(對北송금 사건 탄로됨), 鄭周永, 徐東權, 朴槿惠, 文鮮明.
위의 명단은 김일성, 김정일과 의미 있는 만남을 가졌던 사람들이다. 김일성과 김정일을 만나고 돌아온 뒤의 운명이 나빠진 경우가 많다. 피살 1명, 납북 1명, 자살 2명, 투옥 4명, 숙청 파산 낙선 탄로 각1명.
이런 운명의 變轉(변전)은 우연일까? 惡運(악운)의 비율이 너무 높은 데는 이유가 있지 않을까? 이런 추정을 하게 만든다.
1. 김일성, 김정일은 惡黨(악당)이다. 종교적으론 惡靈(악령)이다. 둘이서 죽인 人命이 약700만 명이니 惡魔級(악마급) 인간이다. 이런 인간을 이용하여 자신의 목표를 달성하겠다는 계산을 갖고 그를 만나는 순간 惡靈의 영향권안에 들어가 속고 이용만 당한다.
2. 그를 만나러 평양에 간다는 것 자체가 그의 무대에 올라가든지 그가 판 함정에 빠지는 셈이다. 惡黨이 조종하기 좋은 상황으로 걸어들어가면 이용당한다. 김구, 김규식, 노무현, 김대중이 그런 경우이다.
3. 김일성, 김정일을 만난 사람들은 대체로 두 가지 감정을 갖는다. 두려움-한국으로 돌아와서 그를 비판하지 못하게 한다. 친근감-일단 만나 인간적으로 대화한 독재자를 비판하는 것은 의리상 맞지 않다는 생각에 빠진다. 이런 자세가 국민들에겐 이상하게 보인다. 김정일과 김일성만 만나고 돌아오면 사람이 달라진다는 評(평)이 생긴다.
4. 李厚洛, 朴哲彦의 경우처럼 對北밀사役을 국내에서 정치적으로 활용하려 들면 질투하는 사람들이 생겨 견제를 받는다.
5. 이념무장이 부족한 민주국가의 정치인이 전체주의 독재자를 만나서 담판하면 불리해진다. 이는 월급장이 사장이 재벌의 오너를 만날 때 눌리는 기분이 드는 것과 비슷하다. 임기가 있는 민주국가의 정치인이 쓸 수 있는 카드는 제한적인데, 임기가 없는 독재자는 무궁무진하다. 원천적으로 불리한 게임이다.
*결론: 대한민국의 대통령이 평양으로 찾아가서 김정일이나 그 후계자를 만나는 것은 절대로 피해야 할 일이다. 李明博 대통령이 이 일 하나만 하지 않아도 퇴임 후가 안전할 것이다. 1938년 뮨헨 회담에서 惡黨 히틀러에게 속아 넘어가 체코를 나치독일에 넘겨주는 결정을 하였던 獨, 英, 伊, 佛의 지도자 4명은 6년 이내에 모조리 자살, 피살, 急死(실각), 몰락하였다.
히틀러는 자살, 이탈리아의 무솔리니는 피살, 영국 수상 챔버레인은 2차 대전 발발 후 밀려난 뒤 急死, 달라디에(프랑스 수상)는 프랑스 항복 후 투옥되었다. 악마급 독재자는 타협의 대상이 아니라 견제나 無力化의 대상일 뿐이다.
李 대통령이 미치광이로 변해가는 김정일을 만나기 위하여 평양에 간다든지 反헌법적-反국가적인 6.15 반역선언을 존중한다고 약속하는 순간 그는 보수층이 아니라 대한민국의 敵이 될 각오를 해야 할 것이다. 김정일을 만나는 걸 가지고 인기를 높이겠다고 결심하는 순간 그의 여생은 순탄치 않을 것이다. 이는 역사가 증명하는 한반도의 진실이다. 아니 인간의 진실이다. 악마와 거래하는 사람이 성공하는 세상이라면 그것은 지옥일 것이다.
================================================================
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test:
Implications of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1874
Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Dick K. Nanto
Specialist in Industry and Trade
Larry A. Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
July 1, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40684
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service
Summary
The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in
response to North Korea’s second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions
on North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons
programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such
shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the
case with an earlier U.N. resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea’s
first nuclear test, Res. 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea’s regime and
its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Res. 1874.
On the surface, financial sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK, the official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a
large monetary effect. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the
resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of North Korean trading
corporations. A key to its success will be the extent to which China, North Korea’s most
important economic partner, implements the resolution. In summary, the economic effect of
Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the
requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that
causes financial institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK transaction. A ban on
luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits.
Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of
the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would
submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be
implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo.
While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and
optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and
therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact.
Other CRS Reports may be useful in conducting research on this issue: CRS Report RL30613,
North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, by Larry A. Niksch CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch CRS Report R40095,
Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin CRS Report RL32493,
North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-
Avery CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Dick K. Nanto
CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin
and CRS Report RL32097, Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for
Ships and Aircraft, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1
Main Provisions of Resolution 1874......................................................................................2
Implementation of Sanctions .......................................................................................................3
1. The Ban on Financial Transactions Related to North Korea’s Trade in Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology................4
2. Search of Sea-Borne Traffic ........................................................................................4
3. Inspecting North Korea’s Air Cargo.............................................................................5
4. The Ban on Financial Support for Trade with North Korea Except for
Humanitarian Goods ....................................................................................................5
Implications of Resolution 1874..................................................................................................6
Trade and Finance.................................................................................................................6
North Korea’s Proliferation, Nuclear and Missile Programs ................................................. 11
North Korea’s Policies and Internal Situation ......................................................................12
Assessments of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) .........................................................................13
Tables
Table 1. China’s Major Imports from the DPRK........................................................................10
Table 2. China’s Major Exports to the DPRK ............................................................................ 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................15
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks over verification issues in December 2008, North
Korea has carried out a series of increasingly provocative acts that have challenged the Obama
Administration and the world community. In January and February, North Korea presented the
newly inaugurated Obama Administration with a tough set of negotiating positions. North Korea
reportedly did not respond to subsequent overtures by the United States to restart talks. On April
5, 2009, North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong 2, over Japan, but
failed to achieve a complete test of the system or place a satellite into orbit. This test led to United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon
the Six-Party Talks, restart its nuclear facilities, and conduct a nuclear test. It asked international
and U.S. inspectors to leave the country.
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion.1 In response, the
UNSC on June 12 unanimously passed Res. 1874,2 which puts in place a series of sanctions on
North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons
programs and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such
shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the
case with an earlier resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea’s first
nuclear test, Res. 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea’s regime and its
weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874.
On the surface, financial sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK, or the official name of North Korea)’s prohibited activities are not likely to have a large
monetary effect. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the resolution
liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of North Korean trading corporations. A
key to its success will be the extent to which China, North Korea’s most important economic
partner, implements the resolution. In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not
likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the
resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial
institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK transaction. A ban on luxury goods
will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits.
Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of
the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would
submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be
implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo.
However, while procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous
and optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and
therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact.
On June 26, 2009, senior administration officials stated that the White House is forming an
interagency team to coordinate sanctions efforts against North Korea with other nations. The team
is to be led by Philip S. Goldberg, a former ambassador to Bolivia, and consist of representatives
1 http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20090615_release.pdf
2 For full text, see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions09.htm.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 2
from the State Department, the White House, the National Security Agency, the Treasury
Department, and others.3
Main Provisions of Resolution 1874
Resolution 1874 condemns the May 25 nuclear test, demands that North Korea not conduct
additional nuclear tests or ballistic missile tests, says North Korea should suspend its ballistic
missile program and re-establish the missile launch moratorium, calls on the DPRK to abandon
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible
manner,” and calls on North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Six-
Party Talks.
The resolution includes a ban on all arms transfers from the DPRK and all arms except small
arms or light weapons to the DPRK. As with past UNSC resolutions, this ban includes weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) or missile-related technology. The resolution also provides for new
economic and financial sanctions on the DPRK. It calls on states not to provide grants, assistance,
loans, or public financial support for trade if such assistance could contribute to North Korea’s
proliferation efforts. It also calls on states to deny financial services, including freezing assets,
where such assets could contribute to prohibited DPRK programs. The resolution is not an
embargo, however, and explicit exclusions are made for humanitarian and denuclearization aid.
These are broad and far-reaching sanctions, if effective, but several problems arise in
implementation (discussed below).
Due to concerns over North Korea’s past track record on proliferation of nuclear and missile
technology, the Security Council deliberations focused on ways to interdict North Korean
shipments of banned items. Past Security Council resolutions (1718 (2006) and 1695 (2006))
have tackled this issue, but the new resolution includes specific guidelines for inspecting and
interdicting ships that transport banned materials. Resolution 1874 calls on all states to “inspect,
in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, all cargo
to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports,” if that state has
information that the cargo is prohibited by UNSC Resolutions. Res. 1874 does not, however,
provide the authority to do so without the flag state’s consent.4 Reportedly due to objections by
Russia and China, the resolution does not authorize the use of force if the inspection is refused.5
In that case, the requesting state is asked to report the matter to the Security Council.
If a suspect ship is on the high seas, U.N. member states are “called upon” to request the right to
board and inspect. If refused, the resolution obligates the flag state to direct their vessel to port for
inspection. The resolution “authorizes” seizure of banned items. The resolution prohibits
“bunkering services” such as refueling or servicing of a ship with suspected cargo. This is
3 Michael D. Shear, “U.S. Interagency Team to Focus On Sanctions Against N. Korea,” The Washington Post, June 27,
2009, p. A7.
4 “Flag state” refers to the country that exercises regulatory control over a commercial ship that has registered under its
flag. Some states may allow foreign vessels to register under their flag, known as “flag of convenience.”
5 Blaine Harden, “North Korea Says It Will Start Enriching Uranium,” Washington Post, June 14, 2009. The resolution
is under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, and does not authorize use of force during interdiction attempts. The
full text of Article 41 follows: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 3
significant because North Korea reportedly ships most goods under its own flag and typically
uses small vessels that would need refueling.
Resolution 1874 also establishes reporting mechanisms on the implementation of the resolution.
Within 45 days of the resolution’s adoption, all U.N. member states are to report to the Security
Council on “concrete measures” they have taken to implement the arms embargo and financial
measures. The Sanctions Committee, established by UNSC Res. 1718, will submit a proposed
agenda for its work covering “compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and
cooperation” to the UNSC by July 15, 2009. The resolution also asks the U.N. Secretary-General
to establish a Panel of Experts, with a maximum of seven experts, to analyze reports and make
recommendations regarding implementation of Resolutions 1874 and 1718.
Implementation of Sanctions6
The Obama Administration faces several key decisions regarding the U.S. role in enforcing
Resolution 1874 and applying new U.S. sanctions against North Korea. The Administration faces
a decision on how assertive to be in confronting North Korean ship traffic to attempt searches. It
also faces a decision on the U.S. role in enforcing the ban on WMD-related North Korean
financial transactions. Officials have said that the Administration is considering a resumption of
the Bush Administration’s financial sanctions policy of 2005-2007 in which U.S. Treasury
Department officials visited numerous countries in order to pressure banks to freeze the accounts
of North Korea’s trading companies.7 Administration officials also have said that they are
considering reinstating North Korea on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism the Bush
Administration removed North Korea from the list in October 2008.8 Finally, the Administration
may have to calculate the degree of pressure to apply to China if Beijing does little to enforce the
Security Council sanctions, as was the case following Resolution 1718.
The Hyundai Economic Research Institute of South Korea has estimated that if U.N. members
enforce the sanctions in Resolution 1874 against North Korea, North Korea could lose between
$1.5 billion and $3.7 billion. Other estimates place the loss close to $4 billion.9 However,
Resolution 1874 does not make enforcement of sanctions mandatory but instead “calls on” U.N.
members to take enforcement steps. If sanctions are to have this kind of impact, several key
countries will have act forcefully and will have to interpret the sanctions language of the
resolution liberally.
There appear to be four key areas of sanctions enforcement.
6 This section was prepared by Larry Niksch.
7 “US to Impose Financial Sanctions on N.Korea—report,” Reuters News, June 5, 2009.
8 “U.S. Mulls Relisting N. Korea As State Sponsor of Terrorism,” Asia Pulse, June 8, 2009. See CRS Report RL30613,
North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, by Larry A. Niksch.
9 “North Korea to Face Huge Losses from U.N. Sanctions: Report,” Asia Pulse, June 11, 2009. Yun Deok-min,
“China’s Nuclear Headache,” JoongAng Daily Online, June 16, 2009.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 4
1. The Ban on Financial Transactions Related to North Korea’s Trade in
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Technology
North Korea’s state trading companies are key vehicles for transferring WMD and WMD
technology to other countries and for transmitting the foreign exchange earnings back to
Pyongyang. The trading companies conduct these transactions through accounts maintained in
banks in numerous countries around the world. The trading companies are particularly active in
China and undoubtedly have accounts throughout the Chinese banking system.10 In order to shut
down these financial transactions, governments and banks in a number of countries will have to
freeze these bank accounts. However, they face the dilemma that the trading companies conduct
other transactions through the same accounts. These include the financing of legitimate
commerce but also laundering money acquired through North Korea’s smuggling of counterfeit
products, including counterfeit U.S. dollars and U.S. products. Neither of these activities are
banned by Resolution 1874. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the
resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of the trading corporations.
Alternatively, the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee will have to expand the number of
North Korean trading companies subject to sanctions considerably beyond the three companies it
designated at the end of April 2009. Japan and the United States had recommended 10 and 14
trading companies to be sanctioned at points in the sanctions committee’s deliberation, but China
and Russia reportedly objected. The number finally was scaled back to three, two trading
companies and one North Korean bank.11 The sanctions committee is supposed to make a new list
of companies within 30 days of the passage of Resolution 1874.
2. Search of Sea-Borne Traffic
The specific provisions set out in Resolution 1874 appear to give the United States and allies the
means to gain access to North Korean ships and thus shut down WMD-related ship traffic.12 This
will be dependent on a number of countries cooperating with the United States, particularly in
applying the resolution’s provision for searching North Korean ships in their ports and denying
provisions of fuel and supplies to North Korean ships that refuse to be searched. China is
particularly important, since North Korean ships frequently visit Chinese ports. Singapore,
Indonesia, and Malaysia would be important with respect to North Korean ships that seek to pass
through the Singapore and Malacca Straits that connect the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the route to
the Middle East and Burma. Middle East-bound ships also stop at ports in India and Pakistan.
India has searched North Korean ships in the past. Pakistan’s cooperation may be more uncertain,
since it has had close relations with North Korea in past years, including purchases of North
Korean missiles and missile technology.13
10 John S. Park, North Korea, Inc., Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial
Activities, U.S. Institute of Peace, USIP Working Paper, Washington, DC, April 22, 2009.
11 “3 Entities Subject to Asset Freeze Over N. Korea Nuke, Missile Program,” Kyodo News, April 24, 2009.
12 David E. Sanger, “U.S. to confront, not board, North Korean ships,” New York Times (internet), June 17, 2009.
13 Paul Kerr, “Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2007,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 5
3. Inspecting North Korea’s Air Cargo
Resolution 1874 is vague in how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented, in contrast to the
specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo. However, many experts
believe that North Korea uses air traffic much more than sea traffic in order to transfer and
exchange WMDs, WMD technology, and WMD scientists and technicians.14 The key to
inspections of North Korea’s air cargo is the air traffic between North Korea and Iran. North
Korea and Iran have extensive collaboration in the development of ballistic missiles.15 It appears
that much of the $1.5 billion that North Korea reportedly earns annually from missile sales and
collaboration with other countries in developing missiles comes from Iran.16 Iranian and North
Korean aircraft on the Tehran-Pyongyang route use Chinese and Russian air space. A weakness of
Resolution 1874 is that it does not specify inspection of North Korea-related cargo in aircraft that
use the airspace of U.N. members. However, aircraft on the Tehran-Pyongyang route reportedly
refuel at Chinese airports. Thus, China has a special responsibility for enforcing the provision for
searches of air cargo.
4. The Ban on Financial Support for Trade with North Korea Except for
Humanitarian Goods
Resolution 1874 reaffirmed Resolution 1718 of October 2006, including the ban on the export of
luxury goods to North Korea. Luxury consumer goods are a key benefit to North Korea’s elite,
the core support group of the Kim Jong-il regime. In the past, the major sources of luxury goods
have been Europe and China. Chinese traders report a high demand for Chinese consumer goods
by the North Korean elite.17 An analysis of Chinese trade statistics for 2008 indicates that Chinese
exports of luxury consumer goods to North Korea was between $400 million and $500 million,
about 20%-25% of China’s total 2008 exports of $2 billion to North Korea. Moreover, most of
China’s exports are reportedly financed by Chinese trade credits to North Korea, which have
generous long-term repayment provisions.18 In short, there is evidence that a portion of Chinese
goods come into North Korea largely cost-free to the North Korean government. Thus, this
sanction will not be enforced unless China’s begins to deny North Korea these lucrative trade
credits.
14 Paul Eckert, “Anti-proliferation Group Only Symbolic Without China,” Reuters News, May 27, 2009.
15 There is also speculation that the two countries may cooperate in the nuclear field, but little evidence to date. Two
CRS Reports lay out extensive information on North Korean-Iranian collaboration: RK 33590, North Korean Nuclear
Weapons Development and Diplomacy and RL 30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal.
16 “What’s Behind the New U.N. sanctions on N.Korea?” Reuters News, June 12, 2009.
17 Robert J. Saiget, “China, DPRK Trade Said Booming Despite Rocket Tensions,” Agence France Presse, April 6,
2009.
18 Ibid.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
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Implications of Resolution 1874
Trade and Finance19
The DPRK is really two economies.20 The first is that of the military, the Korean Workers Party,
and the governing elite. This economy has considerable industrial capacity and first priority for
resources, but much of it is parasitic. It lives off the production from the second economy, the rest
of the country. This economy consists mostly of agriculture, services, light manufacturing, and
the range of economic activity typical of a less developed nation. As a whole, the DPRK economy
is one of the world’s most isolated and moribund. It is in dire straits with a considerable share of
its population on the edge of starvation and in need of outside food aid. Without humanitarian aid
and trade with China, many of its people would starve. For 2009, the Food and Agriculture
Organization and World Food Program estimated that the DPRK is facing a cereal deficit of about
836,000 tons—enough to leave 8.7 million people in need of food assistance.21 The industrial side
of the economy also faces problems with antiquated equipment, lack of raw materials, and
unreliable electrical supply.
The challenge in implementing the U.N. economic and financial sanctions lies in separating funds
and transactions that are related to the military from the normal economic and financial
transactions of the country. Even though the economy as a whole is in shambles, the military and
ruling elite are able to command sufficient resources to pursue their nuclear and ballistic missile
programs. For example, officials from the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) reportedly have been
authorized to acquire any material, resource or item from other commercial projects for use in
North Koreas’ nuclear programs.22 The Army also has reportedly taken over some trading
companies.
The U.N. sanctions target outside resources flowing into the DPRK. These include loans,
assistance, finance, and certain exports and imports. Since most official development assistance is
to meet basic human needs, much of it is likely to continue as humanitarian aid that is permitted.
As for loans, the extent of borrowing from western commercial banks by the DPRK is relatively
small. In December 2008, consolidated claims on the DPRK by banks that report to the Bank for
International Settlements totaled $2.0 billion, down from a peak of $4.2 billion in June 2008. All
reporting banks with claims on North Korean entities were from Europe, with France accounting
for nearly half of the total.23 These figures, however, do not include Russia or China. How much
of this lending activity is purely commercial and how much went to North Korea’s prohibited
activities is unknown. Also, funds are fungible. A loan to a commercial activity in one sector may
free up resources that then can be used for military purposes. China’s trade credits to North Korea
thus may free up to $2 billion in foreign exchange. The potential impact of the U.N. sanctions on
this activity, therefore, is also unknown, but its upper limit would be around $2 billion in lending.
19 This section was prepared by Dick Nanto.
20 For details, see CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto and
Emma Chanlett-Avery
21 World Food Programme, 8.7 Million North Koreans Need Food Assistance, December 10, 2008.
22 John S. Park, North Korea, Inc., Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial
Activities, U.S. Institute of Peace, USIP Working Paper, Washington, DC, April 22, 2009.
23 Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated banking statistics, Table 9D: Consolidated foreign claims of
reporting banks - ultimate risk basis, accessed June 17, 2009.
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Loans for financing international trade transactions also could fall under the U.N. sanctions. Since
the DPRK is not a member of the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, it is not eligible to
borrow for trade finance from these international financial institutions. Export-import banks also
do not fund trade in prohibited items. Over the period 2005-2007, the 21 industrialized nations
that form the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development reported no bank credits for trade for the DPRK. Gross non-bank trade credits
amounted to $6 million in 2005, $110 million in 2006, and $17 million in 2007.24 These data also
do not include credits from China or Russia. How much of these trade credits went for nuclear or
ballistic missile programs is unknown, but the gross amounts involved are small.
On the surface, therefore, financial sanctions aimed solely at the DPRK’s prohibited activities are
not likely to have a large monetary effect. The total amounts of such activity are not large, and
what can be attributed to nuclear or missile activity would be even smaller. Still, as can be
deduced from the 2005 Banco Delta Asia sanctions (see text box below), if financial institutions
are put in a position in which they have to choose between dealing with the United States or
dealing with the DPRK, they often will close the North Korean accounts, even if those accounts
are for legitimate purposes. The BDA sanctions also showed that even amounts as relatively small
as $25 million are important to Pyongyang. A BDA-type strategy, therefore, might be to let
financial institutions know that any prohibited financial activity related to the U.N. sanctions
could bring their whole institution under scrutiny and possible sanctions similar to those imposed
on the BDA. The financial institution may then terminate all transactions with the DPRK because
it feels unable to separate out the legitimate and prohibited transactions.
24 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Statistics, DAC Private Flows to the
DPRK, Non-bank gross export credits, http://stats.oecd.org.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 8
The Banco Delta Asia Sanctions
On September 15, 2005, the U.S. Treasury imposed USA PATRIOT Act Section 311 designations
against Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau. In the action, Treasury stated that the bank was a
“primary money laundering concern” because, among other findings, sources indicated that
senior officials in Banco Delta Asia were working with DPRK officials to accept large deposits of
cash, including counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation. On
September 20, 2005, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of Treasury imposed special
measures against Banco Delta Asia that prohibited U.S. institutions or agencies from opening or
maintaining correspondent accounts on behalf of BDA and required covered financial institutions
to exercise due diligence to ensure that no correspondent account is being used indirectly to
provide services to BDA. Some $25 million in North Korean assets were frozen.
The U.S. action against BDA generated an avalanche of responses both in financial and political
circles. It caused such a run on accounts at the bank that the government of Macau had to take
over BDA’s operations and place a temporary halt on withdrawals. According to press reports, the
Macau government shut down all North Korea-related accounts including those belonging to nine
DPRK banks and 23 DPRK trading companies. These reportedly included accounts from the core
organs of the North Korean Regime.
The financial effects of the BDA action were larger than expected. The crackdown also spread
around the region, with Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, and Singaporean banks increasing
their scrutiny of North Korean account holders. In Macau, the North Korean trading firm used by
Pyongyang as a de facto consulate rolled up its operations as the Macau government placed BDA
into receivership. Not only did the action deprive major DPRK companies of an international
financial base and cut into the secret personal accounts of the Pyongyang leadership, but it
appears to have obstructed some legitimate North Korean trade. Banks from other nations (such
as the United Overseas Bank of Singapore and the Korea Exchange Bank of South Korea) also
moved to sever contacts with North Korea, fearing that they, too, could face U.S. legal action.
On February 13, 2007, a new Six-Party Talks agreement on North Korea’s nuclear program and
energy needs was concluded. In announcing this agreement, Assistant Secretary of State
Christopher Hill pledged to settle with North Korea within 30 days the issue of U.S. financial
sanctions against BDA and the freezing of North Korean accounts of $25 million. After several
failed attempts to transfer the $25 million, the DPRK recovered its funds in June 2007 when the
New York Federal Reserve Bank agreed to transfer them through its facilities to a bank in
Russia.25
On June 18, 2009, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury
Department issued an advisory for all U.S. financial institutions to take risk mitigation measures
against the possibility that the DPRK would use deceptive financial practices to hide illicit
conduct. Specifically, FinCEN noted that with respect to correspondent accounts held for North
Korean financial institutions, as well as their foreign branches and subsidiaries, there is now an
increased likelihood that such vehicles may be used to hide illicit conduct and related financial
proceeds in an attempt to circumvent existing sanctions, particularly those of U.N. Resolution
1874. FinCEN advised financial institutions to apply enhanced scrutiny to any such
25 CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Dick K. Nanto.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 9
correspondent accounts and to avoid providing financial services for North Korea’s procurement
of luxury goods. In order to assist in applying enhanced scrutiny, FinCEN supplied a list of North
Korean banks. It also encouraged financial institutions worldwide to take similar precautions.26
The U.N. sanctions also ban exports of North Korean arms, including small arms and light
weapons. Stopping exports of large armaments will depend on the effectiveness of interdictions
and threats of interdictions of shipments by cooperating countries discussed elsewhere in this
memorandum. DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant. Recently
reported purchases of such items from the DPRK included imports of $45.5 thousand by Brazil in
2007, of $3.1 million by the United Arab Emirates in 2006, and $364.4 thousand by Ethiopia and
$121.4 thousand by Mexico in 2005.27 The small arms export ban, therefore, is not likely to have
a large effect on the economy of the DPRK.
With respect to overall trade, the DPRK may actually be in the process of sanctioning itself. More
than half of North Korea’s exports and a third of its imports have been with South Korea,
primarily through activities in the Kaesong Industrial Complex located in North Korea just north
of the DMZ. Following the negative response by South Korea to North Korea’s second nuclear
and missile tests, Pyongyang announced that all of the contracts regarding wages, taxes, and
usage fees for Kaesong were void and insisted that the monthly wage for North Koreans be raised
from $75 to $300 and the monthly leasing fee be raised from 1.5 to 7 million won ($1,200 to
$5,598). One of the 106 South Korean companies there is already pulling out, and others may
follow. If the industrial complex is closed, it will essentially halt most South Korean trade with
the DPRK. If Pyongyang’s gamble pays off, a sufficient number of South Korean companies will
pay the higher costs of operating at Kaesong. If not and North-South relations continue to
deteriorate, North Korea may lose a significant source of foreign exchange and investment.28
As for DPRK trade with the rest of the world, between a half and three-quarters of its imports and
exports are with China. The United States and Japan have virtually no trade with North Korea.
The vast majority of China’s imports from the DPRK, however, is in non-prohibited items such as
ores, coal, iron/steel, apparel, fish, and minerals. The top six imports in Table 1 account for about
85% of China’s total imports from North Korea. The ores, coal, and fish/seafood originate
primarily from Chinese investments in enterprises in the DPRK.
26 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury, North Korea Government Agencies’ and
Front Companies’ Involvement in Illicit Financial Activities, Advisory FIN 2009-A002, Washington, DC, June 18,
2009, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/fin-2009-a002.html.
27 United Nations COMTRADE database.
28 See CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E.
Manyin.
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Table 1. China’s Major Imports from the DPRK
($million)
Commodity Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 395.5 582.2 496.5 467.7 581.5 754.0
26 Ores, Slag, Ash 15.0 58.9 92.3 118.4 164.0 212.7
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil 17.2 53.0 112.2 102.3 170.0 207.6
72 Iron and Steel 46.8 75.0 72.2 35.2 45.2 78.4
62 Woven Apparel 52.2 49.1 58.3 63.3 60.4 77.3
03 Fish and Seafood 207.0 261.2 92.4 43.3 29.9 40.0
25 Salt Sulfur
Earths and Stone
0.7 1.1 1.3 4.2 7.5 19.3
Source: Congressional Research Service with Data from Global Trade Atlas
Notes: Commodity numbers are 2-digit Harmonized System Codes
As shown in Table 2, China’s major exports to the DPRK include mineral fuels (petroleum),
machinery/boilers, electrical machinery, knit apparel, plastic, vehicles, man-made filaments, and
cereals. With the exception of knit apparel, these exports are essential to the functioning of the
North Korean economy. It is noteworthy that China exports less in cereals to North Korea than it
imports in fish and seafood, contradicting the general impression that trade in food is primarily
one-way from China to the DPRK. With respect to the U.N. sanctions, the links between these
exports and Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs are indirect at best. Nevertheless, the
$400 million-$500 million in Chinese exports of luxury consumer goods to North Korea may be
essential to help maintain elite loyalty to the regime.
China, however, recognizes the leverage it wields through its exports of petroleum to the DPRK.
According to a news report from Japan, following the DPRK’s second nuclear test, China
imposed its own “sanctions” on the DPRK by reducing crude oil shipments through its pipeline
with North Korea. Previously, following the DPRK’s missile test on April 5, 2009, China had
tightened inspections of weapons-related exports to North Korea.29
29 “China Imposes Own ‘Sanctions’ on DPRK by Reducing Crude Oil Shipment, Stepping Up Customs Inspection on
Exports to the DPRK,” Asahi Shimbun (in Japanese), June 13, 2009, Translation in U.S. Forces Korea J2, Korea, Open
Source Digest, Volume II, Issue 114, June 16, 2009.
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Table 2. China’s Major Exports to the DPRK
($ million)
Commodity Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 628.0 794.5 1,084.7 1,231.9 1,392.4 2,033.2
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil 180.7 204.4 285.7 347.5 402.0 586.0
84 Machinery Reactors,
Boilers
27.0 39.6 77.1 83.0 103.8 145.5
85 Electrical Machinery, Etc. 39.6 45.8 56.6 97.6 69.3 100.6
61 Knit Apparel 3.6 4.8 6.2 10.1 23.8 87.0
39 Plastic 24.6 32.0 52.2 52.0 54.6 80.0
87 Vehicles, Not Railway 8.4 18.3 28.3 28.0 53.7 67.3
54 Manmade Filaments 14.6 18.0 28.9 38.6 52.3 55.0
10 Cereals 50.0 15.3 50.3 16.9 36.5 34.9
Source: Congressional Research Service with Data from Global Trade Atlas
Notes: Commodity numbers are 2-digit Harmonized System Codes
Since the sanctions under Resolution 1874 are narrowly focused on items related to the North
Korean nuclear and missile programs, pressure from China would entail using broader trade tools.
In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless:
• China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution,
and/or
• the specific financial sanctions create a ripple effect that causes financial
institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK transaction.
North Korea’s Proliferation, Nuclear and Missile Programs30
At a press conference on June 16, President Obama stated that “North Korea also has a track
record of proliferation that makes it unacceptable for them to be accepted as a nuclear power.
They have not shown in the past any restraint in terms of exporting weapons to not only state
actors but also non-state actors.”31 North Korea is known to have sold ballistic missiles and
associated materials to “several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment,
assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor,” according to DNI Admiral Dennis
Blair’s testimony to Congress.32 North Korea appears not to simply export missile technology, but
to collaborate with Iran and perhaps others in missile development.33 Resolution 1874 may
bolster the ability of the international community to prevent North Korea from proliferating its
WMD and missile technologies to other countries and to halt supply of North Korea’s programs
30 This section was prepared by Mary Beth Nikitin.
31 http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-and-President-Lee-of-the-Republic-of-Korea-Talk-to-the-Press/
32 http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf
33 “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” International Crisis Group, June 18, 2009.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 12
only to the extent that countries are willing to sanction relevant entities, share sensitive
information and stop suspicious shipments.
Some analysts point out that the measures authorized under the resolution will not prevent the
proliferation of nuclear material or sensitive information such as test data or weapons design due
to their portability. However, other analysts and the Obama Administration contend that if all
countries implement what is called for in the resolution, at the minimum North Korea would be
discouraged from attempting to ship or procure sensitive goods. Others point out that, generally,
increased monitoring and sharing of information about North Koreans’ activities abroad may
improve U.S. intelligence related to WMD programs.
As evidenced in the reports to the UNSC Sanctions Committee for Res. 1718, many countries
have existing laws or participate in multilateral export control regimes that prohibit trade in
WMD and missile-related technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has facilitated
international cooperation on WMD interdiction issues.34 However, the extent to which countries
are now willing to sanction their own companies involved in such transactions by placing them
on the UNSC sanctions list (as discussed above) will be a key determinant.
Pyongyang has had an active procurement network for its nuclear program for decades.35
Pyongyang may need to procure items from abroad for further advances. Therefore, increased
international vigilance, stopping of shipments, and financial pressures combined may have a
limiting effect on North Korea’s own programs as well as on its proliferation to others. This may
largely depend on China’s willingness to curb traffic, as discussed in the “Implementation of
Sanctions” section above.
North Korea’s Policies and Internal Situation36
As with all analysis that involves the secretive regime in Pyongyang, the impact of the resolution
on North Korea’s domestic situation is nearly impossible to gauge with authority. However, North
Korea’s recent actions have provided observers with some clues about the internal dynamics of
Kim’s government. In the past, North Korea’s provocations tended to be viewed by the majority
of analysts as ploys to strengthen its negotiating position at the Six-Party Talks. In the 1990s,
severe food shortages and U.S. offers of food aid seemed to moderate North Korean behavior.
Pyongyang’s recent behavior, however, has generally shifted the predominant view among Koreawatchers:
it now seems that North Korea is determined to be a nuclear state, even at the price of
angering its closest allies.
Financial sanctions were designed to target the country’s elite and military enterprises. Most
analysts suggest that the regime has proven quite resourceful at remaining firmly in power despite
a bevy of sanctions in past years. Even at the expense of large swathes of the general population,
the inner circle of elites has been kept happy with limited resources. However, some argue that if
sanctions are carried out effectively, they may have an impact on internal power struggles as
elites vie for resources. Some suggest that the sanctions levied against Banco Delta Asia in 2006
34 China does not participate in PSI. South Korea announced its participation shortly after the May 2009 North Korean
nuclear test. See also CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.
35 “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks,” IISS Strategic Dossier, 2007.
36 This section was prepared by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 13
appeared to be effective at targeting the regime, and that the pain inflicted by those sanctions led
to North Korea’s return to the nuclear negotiations. Others point out, however, that this return was
followed by North Korea’s first nuclear test, indicating that effective sanctions may simply
strengthen the hardliners’ resolve.
Further complicating assessments of how the resolution may affect North Korea’s internal
policies is the assumption that officials in Pyongyang are contemplating a transfer of power. Kim
Jong-il’s reported stroke in August 2008 has elevated attention among international observers to
the question of succession in the North Korean regime. North Korea’s behavior since Kim’s
reported stroke has been characterized as provocative and aggressive, which may be an attempt to
project confidence in the face of uncertainty. If a power struggle is playing out in Pyongyang as a
result of Kim’s illness, it appears that hardline elements are holding sway in decisions such as the
missile launch, nuclear test, and withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks. Potentially, sanctions could
lead to a more inward-looking, hostile government in Pyongyang. Observers point to indications
that the military leadership is taking a more dominant role in policy-making in the past several
months: the General Staff of the military issued a statement in April 2009 that did not mention
Kim Jong-il and strongly suggested that the military played a decisive role in North Korea’s
decision to withdraw from talks and that the military would control future policy regarding
nuclear programs.
Because decision-making within the regime remains opaque, it is not clear how elites in
Pyongyang may be considering Beijing’s reaction in their calculations. In the past, it seems that
North Korean elites were able to depend on China ultimately to ensure their survival. If North
Korea has actually alienated some influential players in Beijing with this round of provocations,
enhanced Chinese enforcement of the sanctions regime could inflict more pain than earlier
attempts. However, some analysts believe that China, recognizing that different parties within
North Korea are competing for influence, may feel even more restrained from pressuring North
Korea for fear of alienating a future power base.
Assessments of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006)37
UNSCR 1874 tightens, expands, and adds to many of the existing restrictions that were included
in UNSC Resolution 1718, which the Security Council unanimously passed on October 14, 2006,
five days after North Korea’s first nuclear test.38 As with 1874, Resolution 1718 was passed in the
hope that it would curb financial inflows that went to North Korea’s regime and its weapons
programs, while imposing minimal humanitarian hardships on the broader North Korean
population.
Less than three weeks after the UNSC passed Resolution 1718, North Korea announced it would
return to the Six-Party Talks that it had been boycotting for nearly a year. The announcement
came after secret meetings with U.S. and Chinese officials. While it is possible that Kim Jong-il’s
37 This section was prepared by Mark Manyin.
38 Resolution 1718 called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs and imposed sanctions on
several types of activities. The resolution banned trade with North Korea in materials related to ballistic missiles or
weapons of mass destruction, and barred exports of luxury goods to the DPRK. It also banned trading with North Korea
in large weapons systems. It also froze funds and other financial assets owned by people connected with North Korea’s
unconventional weapons program and banned travel by such people.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 14
government planned to quickly return to the talks after its nuclear test, it is also possible that the
speedy passage and unanimous support of 1718 spurred the regime’s decision.
However, most analysts consider Resolution 1718 ineffective in economically penalizing North
Korea. The coverage of the provisions was relatively limited, provisions enforcing transparency
on sanctioning countries were relatively weak, military enforcement options were not included in
the resolution, and there was no defined list of the prohibited products. Instead, creating the lists
was left to individual countries, who then reported them to the U.N. Sanctions Committee. This
administrative feature of the sanctions regime allowed countries to avoid or soften
implementation of the resolution. China and South Korea appeared to soften implementation with
North Korea’s decision to return to the Six-Party Talks. Neither country, for instance, published
detailed lists of the luxury goods they planned to sanction. Together, the two accounted for 61%
and 75% of DPRK trade in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
There is strong evidence that China did not rigorously implement the resolution’s provisions.39
According to an analysis by the Peterson Institute’s Marcus Noland, for instance, it appears that
exports from China increased after 2006.40 In 2007, North Korea-China trade in general increased
by 13%, followed by a 41% increase in 2008. In those years, Chinese exports to North Korea rose
by 13% and 46%, respectively.41 While this rise in overall trade is not necessarily indicative of an
increase in luxury goods shipments, it appears to indicate that the sanctions either had no or little
deterrent effect on Chinese enterprises’ normal commerce with their North Korean counterparts.42
As for South Korea, in the aftermath of North Korea’s test, it halted humanitarian assistance.
Food aid shipments from Seoul dropped from 400,000 in 2005 to 100,000 in 2006.43 However,
overall trade between the Koreas jumped by 33% in the calendar year after Resolution 1718 was
adopted.44 Much of this increased trade was due to the expansion of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (KIC), a facility in North Korea in which South Korean manufacturers employ North
Korean workers. The North Korean government derives tens of millions of dollars from the
complex, from rental fees and the portion of the workers’ wages it collects.45
39 Trade in heavy weapons systems such as missiles generally are not recorded, complicating any assessment of 1718’s
arms embargo.
40 Marcus Noland, “The (Non) Impact of U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Working Paper 08-12, 2008.
41 Global Trade Atlas using Chinese data.
42 For more on this point, see Noland, “The (Non) Impact of U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” p. 5, 9-10.
43 South Korean Export-Import Bank’s “DPRK Support Fund,” provided via South Korean Ministry of Unification.
44 South Korean Ministry of Unification.
45 See CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E.
Manyin.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874
Congressional Research Service 15
Author Contact Information
Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Analyst in Nonproliferation
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Dick K. Nanto
Specialist in Industry and Trade
dnanto@crs.loc.gov, 7-7754
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
Larry A. Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
lniksch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7680
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
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